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Abstract
Risks in emerging market economies have considerably gone up as capital
inflows have soared since the global financial crises in 2008. Once the ad-
vanced economies recover, especially in the US where its monetary stimulus
ends, market expectations change. It may then potentially lead to sudden
capital outflows from emerging economies which could lead to loss of con-
fidence in the emerging market economies. To study the impacts of such
event, this paper simulates with the G-Cubed Model. The results show that
once financial shocks hit emerging market economies, it can produce critical
real effects in the economic downturn which will last for a long period. The
simulation also shows the strong interdependence between financial and real
economies. In the emerging economies, expected future incomes and wealth
fall, while the developed economies gain through the reallocation of invest-
ment. Another important channel of the shocks is through trade channel as
most emerging market economies rely on imports for their production inputs.
Keywords: Loss of confidence, emerging market economies, G-Cubed
model, financial shocks
1The author thanks Professor Warwick McKibbin, Australian National University, who
builds this model and also for his valuable lectures, thoughts and comments
1. Introduction
The world economy has not been fully recovered since the global financial
crisis in 2008. IMF (2016) predicts a modest 3.2 per cent growth of the world
output in 2016 which is in line with last year, despite signaling recoveries
in several economies such as the United States (US) and some emerging
market economies. Quantitative easing policy undertaken by the US ended
in 2014, plummeting commodity prices, Chinese currency devaluation, UKs
exit from the Euro (Brexit), and negative interest rates in Japan have been
major shocks for the global economy (IMF, 2016). The first hike of the Fed
Funds Rate in December 2015 has also tightened the financial and monetary
conditions, particularly in the emerging economies (IMF, 2016).
IMF (2016) also reports that the risks in emerging market economies have
considerably gone up since 2013. The escalated risks are originated from risen
participation of foreign investors in bond markets of the emerging economies.
It brings about additional pressures on capital outflow and growing market
volatility. There is evidence that capital flows intensively into Asia since 2009
and it consequently produces large pressures on asset bubbles and inflation
(Taguchi, 2011). It also implies that emerging market economies now become
more vulnerable to external global conditions.
As the advanced economies recover, especially in the US where its mone-
tary stimulus ends, market expectations change. It may then potentially lead
to sudden capital outflows from emerging economies as their capital markets
are vulnerable. If the emerging economies do not have strong financial in-
frastructures, they may suffer loss of confidence which in turn may trigger a
financial crisis (Calvo and Mishkin, 2003). They reveal that emerging market
economies feature weak financial, fiscal and monetary institutions and vul-
nerable to sudden capital stops, currency crisis and high inflation. They find
that between 1992 and 2001, 63 per cent of events of sudden capital stops in
emerging market economies were associated with currency devaluations.
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Many studies have been conducted investigating factors that trigger falling
currencies then lead to a financial crisis and it has been a prolonged debate.
In East Asia crisis 1997 1998, Radelet and Sachs point out that the shock
hitting the economy is simply a swing of investor confidence (McKibbin,
1998).McKibbin (1998) believes that the trigger comes from rising interest
rates in US and its falling equity markets which then make economies with
pegged exchange rate collapse. From another point of view, identified sev-
eral primary factors that cause the crises are unstable international financial
and capital markets, weakness of domestic macroeconomic policy in terms
of loose fiscal policy together with an unbending nominal exchange rate and
poor governance (Dungey and Jacobs, 2010; Hill, 1999; krueger:2003 2003).
Similarly, Grenville (2000) identifies that the major factor causing the crisis
is volatile and huge international capital flows combined with fragile financial
sectors in the domestic economy. Moreover, Hill (1999) notes that the East
Asia crisis was triggered by the crisis in Thailand which experienced com-
bined poor financial regulation, huge capital account deficit, rapid exports
slowdown and climbing capital outflows. Meanwhile, the global financial cri-
sis in 2008 was initiated by overflowing housing bubble in US followed by
sub-prime mortgage market collapse resulting in surging risk premium in the
world (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2011).
This paper argues that a loss of confidence in emerging economies will
adversely affect the emerging market economies through investment realloca-
tion and adjustment mechanism of trade balance. Developed economies gain
from the emerging economies expenses by the reason of expectation changes
of the agents in the economies. In the long run all economies converge to the
baseline due to the existence of adjustment costs but still hard for developing
economies to reach the initial steady state levels.
This paper aims to investigate the consequences of such event to both
emerging market economies and developed economies. The framework used
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to analyze is the G-cubed model as will be described in the following section.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model
and the shocks performed. Section 3 discusses the implications of the shocks
for both developing and developed economies including real effects on na-
tional account and financial, monetary and fiscal responses. Finally, section
4 draws conclusions.
2. The Model
The G-cubed model which is a combination of econometric general equi-
librium modelling, modern macroeconomics and international trade theory
is an inter-temporal general equilibrium model (McKibbin and Wilcoxen,
2013). It also incorporates numerous countries and sectors and has been used
to study a number of policies, such as tax reform, environmental regulation,
fiscal and monetary policy and international trade. This model encompasses
the best features of the modern macroeconomics, econometric general equi-
librium modeling and international trade theory (McKibbin and Wilcoxen,
1999). The G-cubed model used in this paper is version 108V which has
aggregation of seventeen regions and six sectors as shown in Table 1.
Each economy or region in the model comprises a number of economic
agents, i.e. households, government, financial sector, and the production
sectors as listed in the Table 1.
2.1. Firms
Each of the sectors is assumed to be a price-taking firm with production
technology of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Output is
a function of capital, labor, energy and materials.
Qi = A
0
i
( ∑
j=K,L,E,M
(δ0ij)
1/σ0iX
(σ0i−1)/σ0i
ij
)σ0i /(σ0i−1)
(1)
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Regions Sectors
United States (USA) Energy
Japan (JPN) Mining
United Kingdom (GBR) Agriculture
Germany (DEU) Non-durable manufacturing
Rest of Euro Zone (EUZ) Durable manufacturing
Canada (CAN) Services
Australia (AUS)
Korea (KOR)
ROECD (OEC)
China (CHI)
India (IND)
Indonesia (INO)
Other Asia (OAS)
Latin America (LAM)
Other developing countries (LDC)
Eastern Europe and former Soviet
Union (EEB)
Oil-exporting and the Middle East
(OPC)
Table 1: List of regions and sectors
Where Qi is output of industry i, Xij is industry i’s use of input j and A
0
i , δ
0
ij,
σ0i are parameters. A
0
i is the technology level, while δ
0
ij and σ
0
i are elasticity of
substitution and weights of different inputs, respectively. Subscript o reflects
that the parameters apply to the output tier. The δ’s are constrained to sum
to one. At the input tier, XiE and XiM , inputs of energy and materials, are
themselves CES aggregates of goods and services. The goods and services
purchased by firms are sums of domestic and imported commodities with
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imperfect substitutes. All agents are assumed to have identical preferences
over domestic and foreign commodities.
2.2. Households
In the model, households have three activities including supplying labor,
saving, and consuming goods and services. For each region, household be-
havior is modeled by a representative agent with an inter-temporal utility
function (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 1999), in the form:
Ut =
∫ ∞
t
[lnC (s) + lnG (s)]e−θ(s−t)ds (2)
Where C (s) is the household’s aggregate consumption of goods and services
at time s, G (s) is government consumption at time s, and θ is the rate of
time preference. The household maximizes Eq. (2) subject to the constraint
that the present value of consumption equals to the sum of human wealth,
H, and initial financial assets, F .∫ ∞
t
P c (s)C (s) e−[R(s)−n](s−t) = Ht+Ft (3)
Human wealth is described as the expected present value of the future stream
of after-tax labor income plus transfers:
Ht =
∫ ∞
t
(1− τ1)
[
W
(
LG + LC + L1 +
6∑
i=1
Li
)
+ TR
]
e−[R(s)−n](s−t)ds
(4)
Where τ1 is labor income’s tax rate, TR is the government transfers level,
LG is government employment, LC is the quantity of labor used by final
consumption, L1 is labor used for producing investment goods, and Li is em-
ployment in sector i. Financial wealth is the sum up of real money balances,
MON/P , real government bonds owned by public, net holding of claims
against foreign residents, and value of capital in each sector (McKibbin and
Wilcoxen, 1999).
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Household decisions rely on their forward looking expectations and a firm
needs not to be necessarily optimum in short run, but it is instead optimum
in long run. Consumption is built upon present consumption while aggregate
consumption follows consumption weighted average on wealth which includes
valuation of current assets and expected after tax income in the future (McK-
ibbin and Wilcoxen, 2013). In the model, money is introduced by assumption
that household needs money for goods purchases.
2.3. The labor market
The labor market is assumed to be perfectly mobile among sectors within
region, but immobile between regions. It means that wages are equal across
sectors, but unequal between regions. Labor supply is totally inelastic in
the long run implying that it is determined by the growth of population
(Bryant and Mckibbin, 2001). While wages in the short run adjust slowly
depending on contracts, in the long run the wages adjust to full employment.
As nominal wage rigidity in short run is allowed to be varied across regions,
unemployment period is allowed too depending on the institutions of labor
market in each region.
2.4. Government
Real government spending on goods and services in each region is assumed
to be exogenous and allocated among inputs in fixed proportions. The expen-
ditures cover goods and services purchases, interest payments on debt, tax
credits and transfers to households. The revenue originates from corporate
and personal income tax, sales tax, and from the issuance of government’s
bonds.
2.5. Financial markets and the balance of payments
The regions in the model are linked by flows of goods and assets, so that
trade imbalances are financed by asset flows between countries. A current
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account deficit in each region will be financed by capital account surplus,
and vice versa (McKibbin, 1998). Asset markets are assumed to be perfectly
integrated across regions with free capital mobility. It implies that expected
returns on loans denominated in the currencies of regions have to be equalized
period-to-period according to interest arbitrage relation:
ik + µk = ij + µj +
E˙jk
Ejk
(5)
Where ik and ij are the interest rate in country j and k, µk and µj are
exogenous risk premiums demanded by investors, and Ejk is the exchange
rate between the currencies of two countries.
Capital flows in the form of direct investment and portfolio investment
are assumed to be perfectly substitutable ex ante. Since physical capital is
sticky within regions and sectors, if there is a shock lowering profits in the
sector, the physical capital stock will be unchanged, but its financial value
will directly drop.
Financial assets including stocks and flows are explicitly treated at which
investment leads to a capital accumulation, current account deficits create
growing foreign demands against domestic productions and fiscal deficits end
in an accumulation of government debt (mckibbinlee:2004 2004). Aggre-
gate investment is an investment weighted average in proportion to Tobin’s
Q which is a valuation of market of the expected changes in the future in
marginal product of capital relative to costs (Bryant and Mckibbin, 2001;
Cagliarini and McKibbin, 2009; fry:2013 2013; mckibbinlee:2004 2004;
McKibbin and Vines, 2000).
2.6. Parameterization, algorithm solution and baseline
To estimate the parameters in the G-cubed model, a consistent time se-
ries of input-output tables for the US is initially constructed (McKibbin and
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Wilcoxen, 1999). It covers the detailed benchmark US input output trans-
action tables produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for years
1958, 1963, 1967, 1972, 1977, and 1982 whereby parameters within the model
are estimated instead of calibrated (McKibbin and Wilcoxen, 2013; McKib-
bin and Wilcoxen, 1999).
For regions other than the United States, less time series input output
data are available. In order to overcome this issue, restriction is imposed so
that sets of elasticity of substitution within individual industries are equal
across regions. The US elasticity estimates are then used everywhere.
Since the G-cubed model incorporates over 100 forward-looking co-state
variables, it is challenging to solve. It is then solved using an algorithm and
computer software developed by McKibbin (McKibbin, 1998). In this paper,
the the estimated parameters are updated until 2013, by this means, the year
of 2013 is made to be the baseline.
To examine the effects of a loss of confidence in emerging economies, we
impose a shock scenario exhibited in Table 2. The table shows that the real
exchange rate of US currency goes up by 2 per cent permanently in China,
India, Indonesia and other developing countries in Asia, Latin America and
rest of the world.
CHI IND INO OAS LAM ROW
Real exchange rate
USD per unit of local
currency
2 2 2 2 2 2
Table 2: Shock scenario - permanent shock from 2014 and on; in per cent.
3. Empirical Results
The results presented in figures 1 to 9 are expressed in percentage of
deviation showing a comparison to the baseline of the model (McKibbin and
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Stoeckel, 2011). A zero indicates that a variable does not vary from the
baseline.
3.1. Effects on national account, developing vs developed economies
A loss of confidence in emerging economies indicated by a significant de-
preciation of their currencies leads to immediately massive capital outflows in
short run since financial capital is perfectly mobile and it results in reduction
of capital values. The adjustment process in the model derives from a fall in
Tobin’s Q for investment (see Figure 4). As return to capital falls, private
investment falls. These capital outflows also trigger spiking both short run
and long run interest rates and assets’ price deflations. The increase of the
interest rates is a result of a long run surge in marginal product of capital
and monetary authority responses in raising nominal interest rates. Those
higher interest rates imply a higher cost of borrowing. The falls in wealth
combined with the interest rates increases and dramatic cutbacks of expected
incomes in the future result in significant drops in domestic consumption of
the developing economies (see Figure 1 and 2).
According to the model, among the developing economies, other Asian
countries such as Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand and Latin American
countries suffer the most as their investments fall up to nearly 30 per cent and
their outputs drop touching 3 per cent in short term. Indonesia is another
Asian country which also suffers prominently. Unlike those countries, China
is not hurt as high as them with 10 per cent drop in investment and 2.6 per
cent decline in output at most. These results show that Indonesia, the Latin
American and other Asian countries are highly reliant on imported inputs
for production of exported manufacturing goods. As their exchange rates are
severely depreciated, the imported inputs become very costly. On the other
hand, China is not as highly dependent as them on imports for production
inputs.
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The contractions in the domestic consumption lead to contracting econ-
omy in the developing economies in short run. As real GDP collapses less
than investment and consumption, it then contracts less than imports. That
is why real GDP recovers more quickly than the consumption in the long run.
It is also because the physical capitals are still in place which consequently
trigger rapid recovery when the confidence is back. Improving trade balance
also contributes to the recovery process. Exported products of developing
economies become cheaper due to their currency depreciation, so that the
demand for products from the developing economies goes up. The recovery
of Chinas economy in the long run accelerates faster than the other devel-
oping economies because they can sustain the production as its reliance on
imports for production inputs is not as high as the others.
The sharp upsurge in exports of developing economies is in line with the
surplus in trade account. This surplus comes from both exports increase
and imports decrease (see Figure 3). The simulation results show that the
adjustment originates from a large portion of exports surge and a small frac-
tion of imports decline. Combined with the vast increase in Tobins Q for
investment, altogether contribute to the recovery process of the economy in
the long run. However, the real GDP of developing economies such as China,
India and others still does not go back to the baseline until 2033, just about
two decades later.
What happens in developed economies is in contrast with what happens
in developing economies as there are transmissions across regions. There is a
process of investment reallocation in the global economy. In short run, devel-
oped economies gain huge capital inflows coming from developing economies
as there is a substantial increase in Tobins Q for investment (see Figure 4).
It then leads to falling short run and long run interest rates which generate
lower cost of borrowing. The decrease in interest rates stems from dropping
marginal product of capital and monetary authority responses in reducing
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nominal interest rates. Those lower interest rates stimulate non-exports ori-
ented domestic industries in turn. There is also an improvement on the real
exchange rate resulted from the capital inflows. The combination of wealth
rises, falling interest rates and upswing of expected future income initiate the
economy to expand in the short run and consumption boosts up henceforth.
Further discussions on monetary and financial responses will be explored in
section 3.2.
The domestic demand plunge in developing economies is reflected in ex-
ports deterioration of developed economies. The deteriorating trade balance
comes from a large fraction of exports falls and a small portion of imports in-
crease (see Figure 3). Exports fall due to improved real exchange rate which
makes exported products more costly. Imports increase in these developed
economies accommodates the exports surge in developing economies. Ko-
rea suffers the most in the trade deterioration process. It signifies noticeable
trade interdependence between Korea and the developing countries especially
in Asia. This strong trade interdependence gives Korea the highest GDP and
consumption growth for both medium and long run compared to the other
developed economies.
Overall, we can see from Figure 1 that even though the trade balance
deteriorates in developed economies, their GDPs still grow in short run.
This is because the amount of capital inflows originating from the developing
economies is so huge reflecting fairly better prospects to invest. It mirrors
that the expectations of investors change. As a result, it outweighs the
negative effects of trade balance on GDP. Among the developed economies,
US gain the most capital inflows as well as GDP growth in short run. In
the long run, the real GDP of developed economies such as US, Japan and
Germany return to the baseline. This is because investment goes back to
the baseline as a consequence of existing adjustment costs reflected in falling
Tobins Q for investment and due to rapid recovery in developing economies
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when the confidence is back as the physical capitals are still in place.
3.2. Financial, monetary and fiscal responses, developing vs developed economies
The stock market values in developing economies for instance China and
India are dragged down by the loss of confidence in these economies (see
Figure 5). This simulation result is consistent with findings in McKibbin and
Stoeckel (2009) at which stock markets in all developing economies in short
run are adversely affected by loss of confidence during the global financial
crisis in 2009. The falling stock market values cause rises in cost of capital.
As a consequence, it contributes to downturn of investment in the short
run beside the effect of stickiness of physical capital which brings about
a substantial cutback in return to capital as the cost of financial capital
significantly rises at the same time.
Overall, developing economies suffer around 5 per cent loss of stock mar-
ket values in very short term before bouncing back in 2014. However the
composition between sectors is not the same between countries. The loss of
stock market values for non-durable manufacturing goods in China is greatly
less than in India and other Asian countries (see Figure 6). Latin American
countries experience even worse with deviation of 20 per cent. It shows that
China can maintain the production of non-durable manufacturing goods as
they do not rely on imports for production inputs as much as other devel-
oping countries. That is why Chinas stock markets recover faster than stock
markets in the other developing economies. Nevertheless, the stock market
values in developing economies are still below the baseline in the long run.
Unlike the stock markets in developing economies, stock markets in de-
veloped economies grow positively in the short run as a result of reallocation
of investment from developing into developed economies. The rising stock
market values initiate a lower cost of capital which eventually has a positive
impact on investment. In the long run, the stock market values return to
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baseline as the developing economies recover.
The upturn in the stock market values in the developed economies in short
run are driven by stock market values of non-durable manufacturing goods,
except in Japan which is driven by stock market values of services sector
(see Figure 6). Non-durable manufacturing goods stock values in Japan even
collapses until 2018.
The loss of confidence brings depreciation of real effective exchange rate
in developing economies. Because price level is endogenously determined, the
model makes a distinction between real and nominal exchange rate (McKib-
bin, 1998). As shown in Figure 7, the simulation results show that inflation
shoots up in short run in the developing economies, except for China which
goes down in the first year but follows the same pattern thereafter. Mon-
etary policy in China targets the exchange rate (Cagliarini and McKibbin,
2009). It therefore produces less volatility in prices in short run. In the long
run, the monetary policy eventually goes back to initial starting price level
due to the neutrality of monetary policy. In reality, there is some monetary
adjustment as seen in China, India and other Asian countries. In this model,
the monetary adjustment follows a functional form of Henderson-McKibbin-
Taylor rule in the economies which assumes that monetary policy responses
are endogenously determined (McKibbin and Stoeckel, 2009).
The monetary adjustment indicates that there is a larger variance between
nominal and real exchange rates changes in this model simulation (see Figure
5). Greater shocks in inflation bring less change in the nominal exchange rates
transformed into change in real exchange rate. As a result, a rise in exports
gets lesser and exports finally return to the baseline in long run.
Since monetary authority responses affect rising interest rates to some
extent, either short run or long run interest rates should be lower in the
long run by the reason of neutrality of a monetary policy. However, as the
shocks in the real exchange rates are permanent, the level of both short
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run and long run interest rates in developing economies stay higher than
the baseline permanently. The effect of tighter monetary policy appears in
nominal wages. Wages tomorrow depend on agents expectation on today
prices, so when monetary policy is tighter than expected, a price increase is
smaller than expected. It then causes a smaller real wage increase and more
falling real output in short run. On the other hand, higher interest rates
are also likely to attract foreign capital which in turn appreciates exchange
rates. It then crowds out exports and incomes are stimulated through the
changes in relative prices. In consequence, exchange rates, exports, output,
investment and consumption return towards baseline in the long run.
The developed economies go the other way of developing economies.
Falling short run and long run interest rates are expected to rise returning
to the baseline as monetary authority responses are neutral in the long run.
However, as the shocks in the real exchange rates are permanent, the level
of the interest rates stays lower than the baseline permanently. As mon-
etary relaxation is anticipated by the agents, a greater real wage increase
and more rising real output are subsequently generated in short run. On
the other hand, lower interest rates also affect driven back capital, depreci-
ated exchange rates, crowding out imports and dampening income. Thus,
exchange rates, exports, output, investment and consumption are back to
the baseline in the long run.
In addition, the effects of severely depreciated real exchange rates and
higher interest rates in developing economies can also be seen on production
and imports of non-durable manufacturing goods compared to the durables.
Domestic production and imports of the non-durables fall sharper compared
to the durable goods in the economy (see Figure 8). Additional costs initiate
a reduction in the service flows from non-durables so that their demands
decline significantly. Smaller effects in Chinas non-durables are due to less
imports dependence for production inputs compared to the other developing
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economies. In contrary to developing economies, developed economies such
as US and UK experience significant escalation in domestic production and
imports for non-durables which are greater than for durables. The lower
costs trigger a rise in the service flows from the non-durables and demand
for these goods consequently upsurges.
In the fiscal aspect, the government needs to provide incentives to deal
with the turbulence in the economy so that as expected, the government
spending escalates in developing economies (see Figure 9). To finance the
spending, taxes including personal income tax, sales taxed and corporate tax
are increased, given government bonds are unchanged. The wedge between
government spending and taxes levied as shown in Figure 9 reflects surge of
government foreign debt that needs to be paid as a consequence of depreciated
exchange rates. Latin American economies have to supply fiscal stimulus the
most as they suffer the most compared to the other developing economies.
The greater gap between the government spending and taxes, compared to
the others, occurs because several Latin American countries still peg their
currencies to some extent. Developed economies response differently at which
the government spending falls followed by a decrease in taxes as a result of
exchange rates appreciation.
4. Conclusions
This paper has explored the effects of a loss of confidence in the emerging
market economies as reflected in depreciation of domestic currencies rela-
tive to the US dollars. Emerging market economies suffer enormous capital
outflows which in return, real interest rates stay higher for a long period.
In the end, expected future incomes and wealth fall and economies come
into recession. The economy is still hard to get back to the initial steady
states as before the shocks hit the economy, even after a very long period
when investment levels has been back to the baseline. In contrary, developed
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economies gain huge capital inflows from the emerging economies expenses
through the reallocation of investment, even though in the long run the econ-
omy converges to the initial steady states because of the presence of adjust-
ment costs. When the confidence of developing economies is back, economic
recovery performs more rapidly as the physical capitals are still in place.
One essential important lesson for policy makers is that once financial
shocks hit emerging market economies, it can produce critical real effects in
the economic downturn which will last for a long period. The characteristics
of emerging economies itself make such event to happen. This simulation
shows the strong interdependence between financial and real economies. To
hinder such disruptions onto the economy in the future, emerging market
economies need to deepen the financial system in the domestic economies.
It includes currency regimes, financial integration in the domestics and ad-
equate foreign reserves. Although emerging Asian economies has adopted
floating currency regimes, some others including emerging Latin American
economies still peg their currencies. Adequate foreign reserves can play a key
role when such event of reversals and sudden stops of capital takes place. It
can contribute in strengthening the autonomy of monetary system in the do-
mestic economy. Therefore, an understanding of financial and real economic
interdependence is fundamentally important for policy makers.
Another lesson is that countries which are highly dependent on imports
for production inputs of exported manufacturing goods suffer more severely
than less import-dependent countries, an important lesson from China. As
most emerging market economies rely on imports for production inputs such
as capital goods, they become more vulnerable when there is a sudden ex-
ternal shock in the global economy through the adjustment mechanism in
trade balance. Less dependence on imports can reduce the fluctuations in
the economy.
In financial markets, a loss of confidence drags down the stock market val-
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ues in emerging market economies. The stock market values for non-durable
manufacturing goods suffer the most in all emerging economies. However,
Chinas stocks market is not hurt as much as the other emerging economies
and it recovers more quickly than the other economies. Unlike emerging mar-
ket economies, stock markets in developed economies rise in the short run
as a result of investment reallocation. In the long run, they return to the
baseline as the developing economies recover.
In the monetary responses point of view, deteriorating real effective ex-
change rates in emerging economies bring shooting up inflation, except in
China which experiences an inflation drop in the first year. This is due to
the exchange rate targeting performed by China and it shows that Chinas
foreign reserve level is better than the other emerging economies. Higher level
of real interest rates in emerging economies tend to attract foreign capital
which then improves the exchange rates, crowds out exports and stimulates
incomes in the long run. Conversely, in developed economies lower level of
interest rates affect driven back capital, depreciated exchange rates, crowding
out imports and dampening income in the long run.
Depreciated real exchange rates and higher interest rates in developing
economies also have some effects on domestic production and imports of
non-durable manufacturing goods compared to the durable at which the
non-durables fall sharper compared to the durables. In contrary, devel-
oped economies undergo escalating domestic production and imports for non-
durables larger than durables.
Finally, in order to attain a sustainable debt, development of financing
system using domestic resources need to be taken into account by the poli-
cymakers. Incorporating fiscal policy shocks within the simulated model and
examining how the real economic variables response is worth areas for future
research.
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with G-Cubed 108V model
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Figure 4: Investment and Tobins Q, developing vs developed economies; Simulation with
G-Cubed 108V model 24
Figure 5: Stock markets, REER and nominal exchange rate, developing vs developed
economies; Simulation with G-Cubed 108V model25
Figure 6: Stock market values, developing vs developed economies; Simulation with G-
Cubed 108V model 26
Figure 7: Inflation and interest rates, developing vs developed economies; Simulation with
G-Cubed 108V model
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Figure 8: Production and imports of durables and non-durable goods, developing vs de-
veloped economies; Simulation with G-Cubed 108V model
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Figure 9: Fiscal responses, developing vs developed economies; Simulation with G-Cubed
108V model
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